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BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS, OTHER THAN 
WILLIAM ROBBINS. 
The so-called Red Wing Group, which consists of 
thirteen patented claims and four unpatented claims, is 
one contiguous group and it is uncontradicted, in the 
evidence, that said claims which are named and set 
forth in the answer of these respondents (Abs. 12) were, 
at all times in question, the property of these respond-
ents. It is further uncontradicted in the evidence that 
this group of claims has in the past been worked by 
means of three tunnels, numbered one, two and three, 
No. 2877 
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respectively, all of which tunnels are in the immediate 
vicinity of Tract A. Their position with respect to 
Tract A and the dumping space and swale there present, 
is shown on the model to which the Court's attention was 
called upon oral argument, although certain of the 
photographs give a more accurate representation of the 
situation. 
Many of the witnesses produced on behalf of appel-
lant, without hesitation admitted that the natural dump-
ing ground for any mining operations, in the vicinity 
of these workings, was in this swale, although a large 
amount of evidence was offered by appellant to the 
effect that there still remained available dumping space 
east of the right of way. This contention of the wit-
nesses for appellant was emphatically denied by Dr. 
Talmage and other witnesses for respondents. At the 
foot of the slope, east of the right of way, lie the homes 
of citizens of Bingham, which are built very closely 
together along the roadside in Markham Gulch. Dr. 
Talmage states that a practical mining operator, having 
regard for the rights and safety of the public, would not 
attempt to make any extended use of the ground east of 
the right of way for dumping purposes. (Trans. 2212-
2213.) It would be impracticable to dump on any por-
tions of the swale outside of Tract A, for the reason 
that the material would run into the right of way, and 
the abutments of the railroad are in the bottom of the 
swale. (Abs. 144-147.) 
We invite the Court's attention to the pictures which 
are in evidence and believe that it will be apparent from 
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a mere inspection of the contour of the country that Dr. 
Talmage is right when he states that dumping space in 
Markham Gulch is extremely scarce and that by the 
action of appellant in this case, we have been deprived 
of our ability to work this property unless we begin 
anew at some point at the top of the hill where dump-
ing space will be available and where the cost of open-
ing up our property and operating same will amount to 
a very substantial sum—many times the gross amount 
assessed by the jury in our favor here. 
If the mere presence of the railroad running as it 
does, through the heart of our property, did not itself 
inhibit the carrying on of operations in this vicinity, 
and if we might continue to carry on our work through 
these tunnels, the cost of hauling away the material 
which otherwise might have been dumped in the swale 
would amount to $13,000. (Abs. 289.) 
Not including any cross-cuts or other lateral work-
ings, there is a gross footage of 1850 feet in these three 
tunnels. (Trans. 319.) The cost of driving these tun-
nels would be a minimum of $12,950. (Trans. 326-327.) 
By the overwhelming weight of the testimony, the mere 
presence of the railroad at this point has wholly deprived 
us of the benefit of these workings. 
The market value of Tract A alone was $8,000.00 at 
the time of the order of possession (Abs. 302), aside 
from any injury to the remainder of the property. 
The one available and desirable site for a shaft was 
in the vicinity of tunnel No. 1. (Trans. 309-312; Abs. 
128-129; Abs. 198-200.) Deprived as we are of that site 
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for a shaft, the only remaining practicable course left 
for us is to sink our shaft in the vicinity of the Snake 
Tunnel on the top of the hill, which operation alone 
would involve an expenditure of $17,100.00, exclusive of 
equipment and exclusive of additional cost of operation, 
before we would attain the level of our upper tunnel, to-
wit, tunnel No. 1. (Trans. 325.) 
While it is true, as stated by Mr. Schuider upon the 
oral argument, that practically no work has been done 
upon the Red Wing Group since these respondents ac-
quired title, and the history and financial difficulties of 
the North Utah Company has been like that of so many 
other mining ventures in this and other western states, 
it appears without contradiction in the evidence, that the 
fair market value of this property at the time of the 
order of possession in 1910 was not less than $100,000.00, 
and there is as much reason to suppose that our prop-
erty will develop into a great mine and add to the wealth 
and prosperity of the state, as existed at a like period 
in the history of many of our greatest producing prop-
erties. Although between the time that Dr. Talmage 
severed his connection with the property and until he 
next examined it as an expert employed in this case, the 
only additional work that had been done consisted of the 
extension of a cross-cut a distance of about one hundred 
feet, Mr. Bohm, a witness produced on behalf of the ap-
pellant, testified that this additional work in no way 
injured or decreased the value of the property, that as 
good indications for ore were disclosed in this cross-cut 
as were found in other parts of the property which event- / 
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ually led into large ore bodies. This witness further 
states that more development work was not done "on 
account of lack of funds which had been promised and 
did not materialize." (Abs. 427-428.) The attention 
of this witness was directed to certain testimony he had 
given in the matter of the receivership of the North 
Utah Company in December, 1911, and he expressly 
states that he did not wish to be understood as stating 
or as expressing the opinion that the Red Wing Group 
was not then and is not now of great pecuniary value. 
(Trans. 1236-1237.) It further appears, by the testimony 
of this witness, that one of the respondents, to-wit, Isaac 
W. Dyer, on behalf of the mortgagees of the North Utah 
Company, who claimed under a trust deed securing an 
indebtedness of $463,000.00, bought in this property at 
the receiver's sale. (Trans. 1229-1232.) 
IMPOSITION OF TERMS. 
Counsel for appellant devoted the first eighty pages 
of their brief to a discussion of matters which, we re-
spectfully submit, are not in issue upon this appeal. 
Every authority cited in support of their contentions 
here, relates to those immaterial matters. Counsel force-
fully assert that under our Statute and in this particular 
action, the fee is not taken—that a mere easement is 
acquired by the condemnor. I t is also contended with 
warmth that the condemnor may amend its original peti-
tion, surrender a portion of the property or rights 
therein sought to be condemned and may reserve to the 
owner of the fee various rights in, to and over the sur-
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face which may not interfere with the enjoyment of its 
easement. In view of the fact that the Trial Court, 
whether rightly or wrongly, rnled with appellant as to 
all of these matters, the purpose of its counsel in devot-
ing so much space to a discussion of thu law on this 
question is not quite clear. The Trial Court held, and 
the respondents have at all times understood and ad-
mitted that an easement only, is here sought by appel-
lant. The Trial Court held (we believe erroneously) 
that even after the lapse of four years since the order 
of and entry into possession and after respondents had 
rested their case, appellant might amend its petition in 
the manner sought. In view of its appearing without 
contradiction and conclusively that by the proposed 
amendment these respondents were surprised, the issues 
changed, new and different proof required, a contin-
uance thereby rendered necessary, in excess of $3,500.00 
thereby being lost to these respondents and in excess of 
$3,000.00 additional expense being rendered necessary in 
order to meet the changed issues, and its being further 
shown, conclusively and without contradiction, that no 
diligence on the part of the appellant in applying for 
leave to amend had been exercised and on the contrary 
that the reasons for amendment had existed for prac-
tically four years before the application was made, and 
it being further made to appear without contradiction 
that after all respondents had rested their case a care-
fully prepared typewritten brief was handed to them by 
counsel for appellant showing clearly that the intention 
to move to amend had been formed and determined by 
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appellant for some time at least prior to the closing of 
their case by respondents—the court imposed terms upon 
appellant in the sum of $1,750.00 only. As stated upon 
the oral argument, we believe that grave error was com-
mitted by the Trial Court in this matter, not in imposing 
excessive terms but in imposing grossly inadequate 
terms. In this connection we call attention to the affida-
vit of E. 0. Leatherwood, Esq., (Abs. 332-343) to which 
affidavit there was no counter-affidavit or showing what-
soever made. The record is too voluminous to attempt 
any substantial narration of the evidence. I t appears 
from the record in the case in numerous places that the 
physical presence of the railroad would prevent the sink-
ing of a shaft in the vicinity of tunnel No. 1, where Dr. 
Talmage and others who have made a study of the prop-
erty decided that a shaft should be located. During our 
preparation for the trial of the case under the issues as 
framed, we had, of course, made no calculations and 
were not prepared to submit to the jury any evidence 
relative to where we would place our shaft if we might 
dump on Tract A, nor relative to the cost of construct-
ing tramways or other devices for reaching Tract A 
from such other shaft site, nor relative to the cost of 
transporting such material from such new shaft site to 
Tract A. No evidence had been introduced by us nor 
were we prepared to introduce evidence relative to what 
proportion of Tract A had been lost to us as dumping 
space by reason of the abutments, etc., even were we 
now permitted to dump on the now unoccupied portion 
thereof; nor were we prepared to offer evidence as to 
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the practicability of placing material on Tract A so as 
to utilize the unoccupied spaces between the abutments. 
It appeared from the evidence that several thousand tons 
of material had been deposited by appellant on Tract A 
since the order of possession, from the excavation of 
the railroad tunnel and other sources. We were wholly 
unprepared to furnish evidence, without a continuance, 
relative to the amount of dumping space which had 
already been taken from us, by the appellant occupied 
for more than four years and which could not be re-
turned to us by the appellant either through the avenue 
of an amendment or otherwise. Moreover, since Novem-
ber, 1910, we had been absolutely kept from the posses-
sion or enjoyment of Tract A or any part thereof. Dur-
ing that interval, Dyer and the individual respondents, 
other than Bobbins, had been compelled to buy in the 
property at receiver's sale. We have during all of those 
years, been expending large sums of money in defending 
what we deemed to be our rights in this cause, and it 
would have been the grossest kind of injustice to have 
permitted the proposed amendment upon even such terms 
as those offered by the court and by the appellant re-
fused. 
Under paragraph nine of the complaint and under 
the prayer thereof (Abs. 5-7), the appellant sought to 
condemn Tract A "and the whole thereof for an ease-
ment." In paragraph one of our answer (Abs. 11) we 
admitted all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 
five, six, seven and eleven of the complaint of appellant. 
In those admitted paragraphs it is alleged (Abs. 2-6) 
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that it is necessary for appellant to condemn an ease-
ment of right of way over, across, through and under-
neath the surface of the property in question and that if 
permitted to condemn this land for said right of way, 
the same would be put to beneficial and public use. 
I t is true that there is a general denial of paragraphs 
eight, nine and ten of the complaint, but upon the trial 
of the cause (Trans. 1-4) reference was made to the stip-
ulation made upon the first trial relative to the necessity 
of taking the property, and although the nature of the 
former stipulation does not appear in the Bill of Excep-
tions nor does the waiver or stipulation of Mr. Leather-
wood in words technically cover the general denial of the 
allegations of paragraph nine of the complaint, we never-
theless respectfully submit that the record in substance 
discloses such waiver and we invite counsel to indicate 
any portion of the record wherein any contention was 
made or urged by the respondents, relative to the neces-
sity of the taking of the property sought to be con-
demned. It was, of course, thoroughly understood by 
all parties, that there was no issue upon that question 
and the entire record fully supports this assertion. 
However, it is entirely immaterial whether or not 
the necessity of taking all of this property was by re-
spondents denied. Under Statutes like ours, such ques-
tions are preliminary questions for the decision of the 
court, and must be by the court disposed of before the 
trial of the question of damages by the jury. The above 
statement that such a question is one even for the court 
to determine is itself probably little less than a fiction. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
" I t may be said to be a general rule that, unless a 
corporation exercising the power of eminent do-
main acts in bad faith or is guilty of oppres-
sion, its discretion in the selection of land will 
not be interfered with. With the degree of ne-
cessity or the extent which the property will 
advance the public purposes, the courts have 
nothing to do. When the use is public, the ne-
cessity or expediency of appropriating any par-
ticular property is not a subject of judicial 
cognizance.'' 
Postal Telegraph Company v. 0. S. L. R. R. 
Co., 65 Pac. at 739; 23 Utah 474. 
In the absence of any charge of fraud or bad faith 
in our answer, a denial of the necessity of taking this 
property and the whole thereof for this public use would 
be merely surplusage. In any event it would be a pre-
liminary question for the court, and aside from any of 
the foregoing considerations it must be conceded that 
we were brought to trial and required to produce evi-
dence of the value of the estate sought to be taken, and 
the injury to the remaining tract. We did as we were 
required to do, and after we had rested our case, appel-
lant sought to amend in such particular as necessitated 
entirely new and different evidence. What mysterious 
thing is there about a condemnation suit which should 
permit an amendment that would so seriously affect the 
rights of a party and cause him such serious financial 
loss as would have resulted from this proposed amend-
ment, when in all other types of action, the courts of this 
and other states have not hesitated under circumstances 
much less aggravating than those here disclosed, to im-
pose terms which would fully compensate the adverse 
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party for all losses occasioned through no fault of his 
own and occasioned confessedly through the fault and 
gross lack of diligence on the part of him seeking the 
amendment? 
We respectfully submit that had all parties to this 
action assented to the proposed amendment, either with 
or without terms, the Trial Court should of its own mo-
tion, have refused to permit such an amendment. We 
submit that courts will take judicial notice of familiar 
laws of nature. I t appears from the record that the ores 
coming from this property are in part sulphide ores. 
But aside from the character of these ores and their 
effect upon steel when saturated with moisture and 
placed in contact therewith, and even assuming that no 
low grade ore would be thrown upon the dump and that 
only ordinary country rock would be there deposited, 
there can be no possible question as to the effect of moist-
ure upon the steel structure of this bridge, were we to 
be permitted to dump material about that structure. 
The storms of many seasons would not pass before the 
lives of every passenger traveling over that railroad 
would be menaced by such practice. The rolling of large 
boulders and rocks down the mountain side and against 
the cement abutments and steel work, would be a prac-
tice too dangerous to receive the sanction of any court. 
These litigants are. not the only interested parties. It 
would seem that the protection of the traveling public 
would demand an inhibition of any such practice as that 
suggested by appellant in its proposed amendment. To 
quote from one.of the authorities cited by appellant in its 
brief: 
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"If, however, the evidence shows the matter sought 
to be covered by the stipulation, would seriously 
impair the safety of the operation of the rail-
road to the traveling public, the court might 
properly refuse to permit the stipulation to be 
made." 
Eldorado, etc., Co. v. Sims, 81 N. E. 782 
(111.). 
Also see another case cited by appellant: 
Dillon v. Kansas, etc., R. Co., 67 Kan. 687, 
at 692-693. 
For the proposition that the proposed amendment 
and the proposed offer or stipulation of appellant were 
amendments, we also call attention to the following cases 
cited by appellant: 
Spokane, etc., Water Co. v. Jones & Co., 
101 Pac. 515, at 517-518; 
St. Louis & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Clark et al., 
121 Mo. 195, 26 L. R. A. 751 at 765. 
In the Missouri case last above cited, the Court 
holds, that if the proposed amendment results in surprise 
the owner of the fee is entitled to a continuance. 
The power of the Court, under our Statute, to impose 
ierms other than taxable court costs, and to compel the 
payment of such sum of money as will be just and prop-
er under the circumstances of the particular case, we 
understand, was admitted by counsel for appellant upon 
the oral argument. Such has been the universal holding 
of the California courts under the same Statute existing 
in this state. In view of our understanding that this 
power of the court is admitted by appellant, we will 
merely call attention to the following cases: 
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Williams v. Myers, 89 Pac. 972 (Cal.); 
Pomeroy v. Bell. 50 Pac. 683 (Cal.); 
Culverhouse v. Croson, 29 Pac. 1100 (Cal.); 
Jones v. Stoddart, 67 Pac. 650 (Ida.); 
Moravian Seminary v. Bethlehem Borough, 
153 Pa. St. 583, at 588-589; 
In re Waverly Water Works Co., 85 N. Y. 
479, at 482; 
In re Board of Trustees of White Plains, 
65 App. Div. N. Y. 417; 
Mcoll v. Weldon, 130 Cal. 666; 
Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 630; 
Wise v. Wakefield, 118 Cal. 107; 
Gray v. Lawlor, 151 Cal. 352; 
Milwaukee, et al., K. Co. v. Stolze, et al., 76 
N. W. 1113 (Wis.); 
In re, etc., Jersey City, 31 N. J. L. 72. 
During the oral argument, the Court inquired of 
counsel if there was any judgment other than the judg-
ment entered on the verdict of the jury assessing dam-
ages in the case, which judgment appears on pages 701-
704 of the Abstract. This is the only judgment which 
appears in the transcript. Under Sec. 3603, Compiled 
Laws of Utah, 1907, we assume that the final order of 
condemnation should not be made until the damages as-
sessed have been paid. Although this Court has held 
our Statute permitting the occupation of the premises 
before compensation to the owner has been fixed and 
paid, to be constitutional, it would appear doubtful if 
a Statute would be constitutional which permitted a judg-
ment of condemnation before satisfaction of the judg-
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ment for damages assessed by the jury in such proceed-
ing..;. •':•• ••• - • - : . , . > . ' . ^ 
OTHER ALLEGED ERRORS. 
In view of the fact that counsel cite no authorities 
and in their brief little more than mention other alleged 
errors assigned by appellant, we will discuss those mat-
ters as briefly as possible. 
Assignments No. 7, 8 and 9, relate to the action of 
the Court in overruling the objections of appellant to 
questions asked Dr. Talmage concerning the market 
value of the Red Wing Group of claims on October 28, 
1910. Counsel observe that the "proper elements" are 
not included in the questions. No suggestion is made as 
to what element is omitted. An inspection of the record 
will disclose that the estimate of value with and without 
the burden were those which, in the judgment of the 
witness, a person willing but not compelled to sell would 
receive from a person willing, able but not compelled to 
buy in Salt Lake County, on October 28th, 1910. (Abs. 
104-5.) 
Relative to the general qualifications of the witness 
and his competency to testify concerning the market 
value of properties we call attention to pages 285-288 of 
the transcript. His thorough competency as an expert 
and his intimate knowledge of mines and mining and 
familiarity with the market for properties throughout 
Utah and the west is disclosed in numerous places 
throughout his lengthy direct and cross-examination. 
His intimate and long study of this particular group of 
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claims likewise appears in numerous places throughout 
his testimony and we will call particular attention to 
pages 288-309 of the Transcript. He had general super-
vision of the work on the Red Wing Group from 1902 to 
1906. (Trans. 324.) For a statement, in part, of his 
reasons for placing the estimate of value by him given 
upon this property, we invite the Court's attention to 
pages 597-605 of the Transcript. It is further suggested 
by counsel that between 1906 and 1913, Dr. Talmage had 
not been familiar with the property. As stated by Mr. 
Schulder upon the oral argument, practically no work 
had been done on the property during that period. In 
1910 we were deprived of the ability to work this prop-
erty through the action of appellant. As stated by Mr. 
Bohm, a witness called on behalf of appellant, the only 
development work that had been done up until 1910 was 
the running of a cross-cut a distance of about one hun-
dred feet, which in no way injured the value of the prop-
erty. We have not time or space to give the Court de-
tails relative to the large amount of evidence introduced 
on this subject, but we assert that the record, without 
contradiction, establishes that conditions were the same 
when Dr. Talmage left the property in 1906 as those 
existing at the time he gave his testimony. It is true 
that some surface leasing was carried on and Robbins 
had done some work on his lease in Tunnel No. 1; but 
Dr. Talmage visited that tunnel and those workings be-
fore the trial, and there is no evidence in the record that 
any work whatsoever, other than the one hundred feet 
of cross-cut, was prosecuted after Dr. Talmage ceased 
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the general supervision of the property, which in any 
way tended to open up new territory or change the con-
ditions upon which he based his testimony. 
I t is further said that his testimony was remote and 
speculative. We submit, that the absence of ore bodies 
blocked out in a given territory does not preclude the 
introduction of evidence relative to the market value and 
that a property may have great market value without 
having any considerable ore in sight. As to the law on 
this phase of the question, we will make further reference 
later. 
Assignment No. 10, relates to the overruling by the 
Court of the objection of appellant to a question put to 
Dr. Talmage wherein he was asked to assume that Bob-
bins, the lessee, could not dump on Tract A. This mat-
ter, as suggested by appellant in its brief, is substan-
tially discussed under a former heading. We believe it 
manifest that under the pleadings as they existed at the 
time the question was put and as they still exist, neither 
Mr. Bobbins nor the other respondents had any right to 
dump waste material upon Tract A and it was therefore 
a perfectly proper assumption to make in the question 
complained of. 
Assignment No. 11 relates to the same matter in-
volved in assignment No. 10. 
Assignment No. 12 relates to the overruling, by the 
Court, of appellant's objection to a question propounded 
to the witness Orem, wherein he is asked whether or not, 
in his judgment, as a practical mining man, a reasonably 
prudent, skillful mining man would expend money and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
labor in extending Tunnels No. 1 and 2, with a reason-
able expectation of getting a fair return in money from 
the discoveries that might be made. The claim is urged 
that the elements in the question are too speculative and 
remote. As heretofore remarked, we contend that it is 
no prerequisite to market value that known ore bodies 
be blocked out. If this is true, it is impossible to see 
how competent evidence of value can be presented to a 
jury unless the judgment of experienced, skilled mining 
men can be obtained relative to the likelihood of discov-
ering ore by extending exploration. Practically the 
identical question here complained of was held to be a 
proper question in the following Colorado case: 
Wilson v. Harnette, 75 Pac. 395 (Colo.). 
Also see: 
Noyes v. Clifford, 94 Pac. at 845 (Mont.); 
Montana Railway v. Warren, 137 U. S. at 
352, 34 L. Ed. 681. 
Assignment No. 13 relates to the overruling of ap-
pellant's objection to a question propounded to the wit-
ness Orem, wherein he is asked to state his judgment rel-
ative to the market value of this group of claims. This 
question is a continuation of a former question put to 
the same witness found on pages 675-676 of the Tran-
script in which he is asked to state what a person willing 
but not compelled to sell would receive for this group of 
claims in the fall of 1910 at Bingham, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, from a buyer who was willing and able 
but not compelled to buy. The competency of this wit-
ness seems to be the only matter urged in this connection. 
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We again call attention to the evidence heretofore 
referred to, to the effect that the property was in the 
same condition at the time of the order of possession as 
in 1906. This witness testified that since 1896 he has 
followed the mining business. From 1907 to 1909 he 
was attending the Institute of Technology in Boston^ 
where he took a course in mining engineering. He 
worked at this property from 1897 until 1907 when he 
left for school and being, at the time he left, in charge 
of the property. (Trans. 663-664.) His acquaintance 
with the property appears conclusively to have been of 
the most intimate character. Among other ore bodies, 
he described the Jumbo Stope on No. 2 level, in which 
there was a great deal of first class ore running forty 
per cent lead and from $2.00 to $12.00 in gold and silver. 
This stope, at the time it caved (this cave occurred in 
about the year 1899) was twenty feet between the walls 
and seventy-five to eighty feet long. (Trans. 670-671.) 
About seventy-five per cent to eighty per cent of 
the territory embraced within the Red Wing Group, Mr. 
Orem states, is unexplored territory. He has been asso-
ciated with the firm of A. J . Orem & Company as a mem-
ber since its organization in 1904. I ts business, during 
all of that time, has been that of buying and selling 
mines. He has, at all times, been familiar with its busi-
ness and while in school at Boston, kept in constant 
touch with its Boston office and during all of that period 
that company has been engaged in buying and selling 
mines throughout the west including Utah. (Trans. 681-
683.) From the time he left the property in 1907 until 
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and including 1910, he kept in touch with the mining sit-
uation in Salt Lake County and the transactions in min-
ing property throughout the country. (Trans. 677.) He 
had knowledge of sales of various kinds of mining prop-
erties, some located in Bingham, including the sale of 
this group of claims to the North Utah Company in 1907. 
(Trans. 675.) We respectfully submit, that if Mr. 
Orem, whose business during all of the years in question, 
was that of buying and selling mines and mining prop-
erty and working and operating the same, is not a com-
petent witness, then it would be useless to search for a 
witness whose competency would not be denied. When 
this witness stated that the market for Bingham prop-
erties was largely an eastern market he did nothing more 
than state a fact which is well known to everyone and 
this statement certainly in no way affected his compe-
tency. Had he asserted the contrary it might have given 
rise to a just suspicion that he was not very familiar 
with deals in Bingham properties. Had there been 
merit in appellant's objection to the testimony of the 
witness Orem, relative to the market value of the Red 
Wing Group, it would be harmless error since the sole 
matter of importance on the trial was the damage suf-
fered by respondents as a result of the taking of the 
property sought to be condemned. The witness was 
allowed to testify, without any objection whatsoever 
being interposed, that in his judgment the damage sus-
tained by reason of the taking by appellant was the sum 
of $35,000.00. (Trans. 683-4.) 
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In assignment No. 14 appellant complains of the 
order of the Court sustaining an objection to a question > 
put by counsel for appellant to the witness Sterling Tal-
mage, wherein he sought to inquire of the witness 
whether ore of a certain metallic contents was "commer-
cial o re . " This witness, on his direct examination, gave 
no testimony whatsoever, relative to what is or is not 
commercial ore; he did not pretend to have any knowl-
edge whatsoever relative to freight or treatment charges, 
or assay charges or cost of mining. He was not pro-
duced as a witness on any of those matters nor did he 
give any testimony concerning any of them. An inspec-
tion of his testimony, which appears on pages 90-93 and 
279-283 of the transcript, discloses that the sole matters 
gone into with the witness were the time and place of 
taking certain samples, and he merely read from the cer-
tificate of the assayer what was there recited, Mr. Ellis 
having waived (Trans. 280) any verification by the as-
sayer of the certificate. Although the sustaining of the 
objection was so manifestly proper that no pretext for 
criticism exists, we call attention to the fact that the 
method of arriving at what is and what is not commer-
cial ore—the freight, treatment, and assay charges, the 
cost of mining, etc., were all gone into fully by other wit-
nesses both for appellant and respondent; the particu-
lar sample to which the attention of the witness was 
directed in the question, was made the subject matter of 
questions put to other witnesses, and careful computa-
tions were made by those competent to make them rela-
tive to the commercial value of this sample and of all 
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The only remaining matter discussed by appellant 
which concerns these respondents is the claim that we 
might build a track across the right of way at small cost 
and dump to the east of Tract A. This matter has al-
ready been discussed at sufficient length. Under the 
evidence, heretofore referred to, there was no available 
dumping space at that point. Under the pleadings, we 
could not construct a track or other permanent structure 
upon Tract A. At no time did appellant offer any 
amendment conceding us that right. Of course, under 
the proposed amendment, we would have had that right 
among numerous other rights; but no amendment was 
made and under the pleadings we could not construct a 
track or other permanent structure upon the right of 
way. Under the authorities cited by appellant in its 
brief, the use to which the owner of the fee might put 
any portion of the right of way was one which did not 
exclude the owner of the easement from any portion of 
the property subject to the easement. As stated in the 
Atchison case, 62 Kan. 416, the right of the owner of the 
fee to pass over the right of way was that of a mere 
licensee and could not ripen into a prescriptive right and! 
might be terminated at the pleasure of the owner of the 
easement. The same holding was made in the East Ten-
nessee Railroad case, 10 L. R. A. 855, which is cited by 
appellant. No Court, whatever may be its views rela-
tive to concurrent user, has ever refused to follow the 
doctrine laid down in the Kansas Central Railroad Co. 
case, 45 Kan. 716, cited by appellant, wherein the Court 
says, at 719: 
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'And although the property is taken ostensively for 
a public purpose, yet all the authorities agree 
that the railroad company, by procuring its 
right of way and paying for it, procures an 
actual, individual, private right, an easement 
and an estate paramount to the rights or inter-
ests of all others, except the right of the state to 
again subject the land to be taken under the 
power of eminent domain. ' ' 
Under all of the authorities, the right of the con-
demnor is the paramount right and the right of the 
owner of the fee is the servient right. As pointed out by 
the Texas Court in the case cited below this paramount 
right exists in and to every par t and portion of the 
land condemned. The right of the railroad company 
under the pleadings in this case is paramount to the 
right of the respondents in and to every square inch of 
the surface of Tract A. Therefore, even were there any 
merit to the contention of appellant that we might freely 
cross over the surface of Tract A or drive animals or 
teams thereover, such conclusion would in no way indi-
cate that we had the right to erect any permanent struc-
ture thereon. To hold that we had the right to erect a 
permanent structure upon Tract A would be to hold that 
our right was not servient, but was paramount and dom-
inant as to so much of the surface as might be covered 
by such structure. The courts of every shade of opinion 
repudiate such theory. For an excellent statement of the 
reasons for the rule as we contend it to be, we invite the 
Court 's attention to the following cases: 
Olive v. Sabine E. Co., 33 S. W. 139 (Tex.). 
Also see: 
v 
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Cunningham v. Eome R. Co., 27 Ga. 499; 
Cairo, etc., R. Co. v. Brevort, 62 Fed. 129. 
In conclusion we earnestly insist that if any injus-
tice was done upon the trial of this cause, either by the 
Court or by the jury in its assessment of the damages, 
the respondents and not the appellant were the recip-
ients of that injustice. The cause has been tried twice. 
Appellant has surely had its day in court and a fair and 
impartial trial. The record in this case is free from 
error to an extraordinary degree, considering the length 
of the trial and the matters involved. We confidently 
assert that no error prejudicial to the rights of appel-
lant was committed by the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. 0. LEATHERWOOD, 
P. T. FARNSWORTH, JR., 
Attorneys for Respondents, Other than William Bobbins. 
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